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THE FORGOTTEN FISA COURT:
EXPLORING THE INACTIVITY OF THE ATRC
© 2019 Aram A. Gavoor1 & Timothy M. Belsan2
I.

INTRODUCTION

After twenty-three years and despite an always-ready cadre of five federal
judges, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”) has not heard a single case.3
The ATRC is an Article III body4—distinct from the administrative immigration

1

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
The authors thank David Byerley for his research support. They also thank the
participants of the scholars’ workshop hosted by The C. Boyden Gray Center for the
Study of the Administrative State at the George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law
School.
2
National Security Fellow, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies; former law
clerk to the Hon. (Ret.) Deanell Reece Tacha, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors.
3
Not only has the ATRC never heard a case, it has also never received or considered an
ex parte, sealed application from the Department of Justice to initiate proceedings. FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT, 1996-PRESENT,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-1996-present (last visited
April 11, 2019) (“As of 2018, the removal court had never received an application from
the Attorney General for the removal of an alien terrorist, and had therefore conducted no
proceedings.”).
4
See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58–59 (1982)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (Brennan, J. with whom Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ. joined; Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment, with whom O’Connor, J.,
joined) (describing the necessary attributes for the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States). Though some describe the ATRC as an “Article I court” based on the fact
that it was created by Congress, e.g., Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A
Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2178 (2006), “given
that the court is staffed entirely by Article III judges serving in [an] adjudicative role, it
appears likely that the Alien Terrorist Removal Court would be considered an Article III
court,” see ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43746, CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 8,
n.64 (2014) (citing United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987)). In a
similar fashion to its creation of the ATRC, Congress “relied on its Article III power to
‘ordain and establish’ the lower federal courts when it created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(FISCR)[,]” and“[e]ven though these [the FISC and FISCR] courts sit only to hear a
hyper-specialized set of cases, there is no question that they are Article III courts, since
they are staffed by Article III judges and exercise ‘the judicial power of the United
States.’” STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 647 (6th ed. 2016) (citing
In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (FISA Ct. 2007)
(“Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the FISC is an inferior federal court
established by Congress under Article III[.]” (footnote omitted))).
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courts—that exists to adjudicate civilly prosecuted alien5 deportation hearings
within which the government can use classified evidence against alleged terrorists
without exposing national security information to the defendant or to the public.6
Established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and with
a design that was heavily influenced by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
to the degree that it was intended to be populated by the same judges,7 the court’s
statutory predicate was championed at the request of President Clinton by thenSenators Joe Biden and Bob Dole. This article uniquely establishes that the ATRC
was dead on arrival due to its unworkable—yet legislatively remediable—
procedural flaws. We will examine the dynamic history of this forgotten court,
analyze its structure, justify the continuing need for it in light of substantial
intervening legislation, and lastly propose a commonsense legislative revision that
would render this important national security law enforcement tool viable.
In particular, there is still a continuing need for an ATRC to remove certain
terrorist lawful permanent residents (LPRs). Though intervening statutes, such as
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)8 and
the USA PATRIOT Act,9 have provided alternative means to criminally prosecute
and/or remove noncitizens who otherwise would be theoretical candidates for the
ATRC, there is no other law enforcement recourse for certain terrorist LPRs than
this specialized national security court. In particular, there is no recourse to remove
LPRs against whom the sole evidence of their terrorist identity is FISA-obtained or
derived or foreign intelligence information that is not appropriate for
declassification or public acknowledgment.
The ATRC statutes, however, are flawed in two dispositive ways. First, the
conjunctive findings necessary for the United States to proceed with an ATRC
removal proceeding where the court does not approve of the government’s
proposed unclassified summary of key evidence should be styled in a disjunctive
formulation. Under the current scheme, the ATRC must find both that,
(I) the continued presence of the alien in the United States would
likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or
death or serious bodily injury to any person, and (II) the provision
of the summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to
5

The Court recently utilized the term “noncitizen” in the place of “alien” to “refer to any
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.
Ct. 2105, 2109-10 n.1 (2018). This article utilizes the term “alien” only when its use is
inextricably intertwined with the nuances of the statutory scheme that it examines.
6
8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537.
7
Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or “Summary” Justice?: The Alien Terrorist
Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143, 146 (1996) (“The removal court is modeled after the
seven-member secret court set up under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA).”).
8
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (Sept. 30, 1996).
9
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
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the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any
person.10
The conjunctive provisions situate the government in the same type of “Catch-22”
dilemma that justified the ATRC’s creation in the first place—the untenable choice
between disclosing and risking sources and methods underlying national security
information versus the removal of alien terrorists. As evidenced by decades of nonuse, the burden placed on the government by this conjunctive provision is too high
and renders the ATRC unviable.11
Second, the language that describes the threat posed by the disclosure of the
needed classified evidence establishes a problematically unclear level of
classification. The ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable harm to
the national security.”12 That standard appears to exist somewhere between the
standards for classifying evidence as “Secret”—“serious damage” to the national
security—and “Top Secret”—“exceptionally grave damage” to the national
security). In light of these settled standards for classifying evidence that have
existed for more than forty years,13 Congress should incorporate this normative
formulation of classification to provide clarity to both the Department of Justice
and the court regarding what type of classified evidence it contemplates being
sufficient for proceeding without a summary.14
Additionally, while making the foregoing critical revisions, Congress
should make other minor changes related to the use of classified evidence in ATRC
decision-making to clarify its original intent.15 For example, the ATRC statutes
should be revised to clarify that classified evidence submitted to the court for in
camera and ex parte review may be part of the basis for the court’s decision,
which—despite being the undisputed animating purpose of the ATRC—presently
is only implied.16
This proposal is a precise and narrow solution that would render the ATRC
a viable forum for the nation’s most difficult national security immigration removal
cases, maintaining an irreducible minimum of due process afforded by providing
initial and direct Article III judicial involvement and oversight. These solutions,
along with the underlying statutes, are designed to be constitutionally compatible,
but also minimalist to achieve the court’s operability in a non-politicized way. The
ATRC was never intended to be a high-volume court used for run-of-the-mill
removal cases. It was intended to be a viable option for removing noncitizens who
posed the greatest threat to the national security without having to compromise
national security information and sources to do so.
10

8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
See infra § IV.A.
12
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
13
See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (June 28, 1978) (enumerating the
types information that can be classified and the classification levels); see also Exec.
Order. No. 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 22, 1940) (establishing certain military
information as “‘secret, ‘confidential,’ or ‘restricted’”).
14
See infra § IV.B.
15
See infra § IV.C.
16
8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5).
11
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II.

HISTORY & FRAMEWORK OF THE ATRC
A. The Legislative Story of the ATRC

The ATRC was created to address a “recurring problem experienced by the
Department of Justice”—the inability to use classified information obtained in the
course of antiterrorism investigations in removal proceedings without putting at
risk the sources and methods responsible for such information.17 Famously, in the
late 1980s, the Justice Department sought to deport a group of noncitizens in Los
Angeles “for their activity on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP).”18 That group came to be known as the “L.A. Eight.”19 In
January 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested them for
immigration violations and attempted to detain them pending removal
proceedings.20 The INS asserted that it had classified evidence that justified the

17

Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 17
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 22, 2002, at 1,
http://www.wlf.org/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf. Indeed, the House Conference
Report that accompanied the law that ultimately created the ATRC noted, “[t]he removal
of alien terrorists from the United States, and the prevention of alien terrorists from
entering the U.S. in the first place, present among the most intractable problems of
immigration enforcement.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 115 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). The
House Conference Report further stated that:
The stakes in such cases are compelling: protecting the very lives and
safety of U.S. residents, and preserving the national security. Yet, alien
terrorists, while deportable under section 241(a)(4)(D) of the INA, are able
to exploit many of the substantive and procedural provisions available to
all deportable aliens in order to delay their removal from the U.S. . . . In
several noteworthy cases, the Department of Justice has consumed years
of time and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars seeking to
secure the removal of such aliens from the U.S. . . . The need for special
procedures to adjudicate deportation charges against alien terrorists is
manifest.
Id.
18
Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It & Lose It”: An Exploration of Unused
Counterterrorism Laws & Implications for Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 677, 680–81 (2012) (quoting Benjamin Wittes, Secret Deportation
Panel Raises Due Process Issues; Critics Blast New Court Set up by Anti-Terrorism Law,
RECORDER (Cal.), Apr. 25, 1996, at 1).
19
See Jeanne A. Butterfield, Do Immigrants Have First Amendment Rights? Revisiting
the Los Angeles Eight Case, 212 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 4, 4 (Fall 1999). The LA Eight
were actually comprised of seven Palestinians and one Kenyan spouse. Id.; Neil
MacFarquhar, U.S., Stymied 21 Years, Drops Bid to Deport 2 Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/us/01settle.html?_r=0.
20
See Butterfield, supra note 19, at 4.
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detention, but an administrative immigration judge refused to consider such
evidence and ordered their release.21
In 1988, the Ronald Reagan Administration first proposed the creation of a
court comprised of federal judges that would allow the government to balance the
competing priorities of removal, where the defendant could defend against the
charges and the government could protect classified information.22
Congress did not act on President Reagan’s proposal23 with the Democratcontrolled Senate “refus[ing] to hold hearings on the proposal.”24 Nor did Congress
act on the George H.W. Bush Administration’s renewed push for the creation of
such a specialized court.25 Although the creation of such a court was “one of the
[Justice Department’s] top counterterrorism legislative priorities in the mid1990s”26 and had been pushed by multiple presidential administrations, “Congress
failed to pass any of the bills providing for these special procedures to remove alien
terrorists” across three presidential terms, from 1989 through 1994.27

21

See id. After decades of litigation, including in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, it
appears that ultimately none of the L.A. Eight were ordered removed and some have
become U.S. citizens. MacFarquhar, supra note 19. In December 2006, Aiad Barakat
was naturalized in Los Angeles. See Judge Throws Out Charges in “Los Angeles Eight”
Case, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (last updated Oct. 23, 2007),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/judge-throws-out-charges-losangeles-eight-case. Three other members have been granted lawful permanent residency.
Id. In October 2007, an immigration judge terminated deportation proceedings against
two others, Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, both of whom were lawful permanent
residents when arrested and charged. Id. At least one scholar has suggested that “if the
ATRC statutory framework was available in 1987, the DOJ would have successfully
deported the L.A. Eight without revealing to them classified information.” Jonathan H.
Yu, Combating Terrorism with the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 5 NAT’L SEC. L.
BRIEF 1, 4 (2015).
22
Valentine, supra note 17, at 1-2. The Reagan Administration’s proposal was labeled
the “Terrorist Alien Removal Act.” Blum, supra note 18, at 681; Clarence E. Zachery,
Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or
Becoming the Enemy from Within?, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 291, 292 (1995). See also 134
CONG. REC. H3125 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (noting receipt of “[a] letter from the Acting
Assistant Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled,
‘Terrorist Alien Removal Act of 1988’; to the Committee on the Judiciary.”), 1988 WL
170924; 134 CONG. REC. S7882 (daily ed. June 15, 1988) (noting receipt of “[a]
communication from the Acting Secretary Attorney General, Department of Justice,
transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled the Terrorist Alien Removal Act; to
the Committee on the Judiciary”), 1988 WL 171377.
23
Valentine, supra note 17, at 2; Yu, supra note 21, at 2-3.
24
Blum, supra note 18, at 681; see also Zachery, supra note 22, at 292.
25
Valentine, supra note 17, at 2.
26
THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., STAFF REPORT: 9/11 & TERRORIST TRAVEL at 97 (2004).
27
Zachery, supra note 22, at 292 (citing 139 CONG. REC. 15249-01 (1993) (statement of
Sen. Smith); 140 CONG. REC. 14534-02 (1994) (statement of Sen. Smith)).
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In February 1995, then-Senator Joe Biden introduced on behalf of President
Bill Clinton a bill that, inter alia, sought the creation of the ATRC.28 The bill
sought to advance many of the terrorism-related provisions that both Presidents
Reagan and Bush had pushed for without success. Two months later, on April 19,
1995, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds of others.29
The Oklahoma City bombing captured the country’s attention and crystallized the
resolve of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to address terrorism.30
One week after the Oklahoma City bombing, Senate Majority Leader Bob
Dole introduced the then-labeled “Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995.”31 That bill contained language related to the creation of a removal court for
alien-terrorists, but with less-comprehensive provisions than the version introduced
earlier at President Clinton’s behest.32

28

S.390, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 CONG. REC. S2502-03 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Biden) (noting “I have introduced this bill at the President’s request,”
but expressing concerns about the ATRC provisions as written); 141 CONG. REC. S239899 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (letter from President Clinton to Congress on the Omnibus
Counterterrorism Act of 1995) (“[One] of the most significant provisions of the bill will .
. . provide a workable mechanism, utilizing U.S. District Court Judges appointed by the
Chief Justice, to deport expeditiously alien terrorists without risking the disclosure of
national security information or techniques.”); Zachery, supra note 22, at 292.
29
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE EXECUTION OF
TIMOTHY MCVEIGH (May 11, 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2001/May/218ag.htm.
30
See Carol W. Lewis, The Terror that Failed: Public Opinion In the Aftermath of the
Bombing in Oklahoma City, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 201 (2000). It bears noting that the
February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which killed six and injured more than
1,000 individuals and which involved foreign nationals committing acts of terrorism on
U.S. soil, see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FIRST STRIKE: GLOBAL TERROR IN
AMERICA (February 26, 2008),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608, also
played a significant role in the legislative story of the ATRC, see William C. Nagel, Law
Enforcement Approach to Combating Terrorism: An Analysis of US Policy at 38 (June
2002) (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438507; Yu, supra note 21, at 3. It did not, however,
crystallize sufficient political will to enact anti-terrorism legislation. Zachery, supra note
22, at 292.
31
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S.735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141
CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. April 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“America will not
be intimidated by the madmen who masterminded last week’s vicious and cowardly
bomb attack in Oklahoma City”).
32
Senator Biden referred to the Dole-introduced bill as “[t]he Republican substitute bill,”
noting that it was “built largely around [the] proposals” in the bill he had introduced
earlier in the year on behalf of President Clinton. See 141 CONG. REC. S7484 (daily ed.
May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson,
Preventing A Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21
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The following week, five Democrat Senators (Joe Biden, Thomas Daschle,
Dianne Feinstein, Christopher Dodd, and Herb Kohl) introduced a revamped
version of President Clinton’s proposed legislation as Senate Bill 761, adding
additional provisions seeking “to give Federal law enforcement additional
resources and tools to use in combating domestic and international terrorism on
American soil.”33 Notably, S.761 included more robust language related to the
ATRC, including provisions that were not in the Dole bill regarding the possibility
that the ATRC might deem inadequate the government’s proposed unclassified
summary of evidence showing the alien had engaged in terrorist activity, and the
circumstances in which removal proceedings nonetheless would be permitted to
press forward without the provision of an adequate summary.34
Thereafter an agreement was reached, in which more robust provisions
related to the ATRC—including provisions concerning proceeding without a
summary—were included in the Dole bill,35 which was eventually renamed the
“Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (AEDPA). An
amendment sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter was then adopted, which added
language requiring dismissal of the action if the ATRC deemed inadequate the
government’s initial proposed unclassified summary.36

OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 248 (1996) (discussing “the President’s very broad bill
(Clinton bill) and majority leader Dole’s slightly narrower bill (Dole bill)”).
33
The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S.761, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141
CONG. REC. S6202 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (“Coupled with
the President’s earlier antiterrorism bill directed at international terrorism, this is a sound
step to respond to a national threat without throwing overboard the civil rights of lawabiding citizens.”).
34
Compare The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S.761, 104th Cong. (1995)
(Democrat Bill), with Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S.735, 104th
Cong. (1995) (Republican Bill).
35
S. Amend. 1199 to S.735, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S7553 (daily ed. May
25, 1995) (filed on behalf of Senators Dole, Hatch, Nickles, Inhofe, Gramm, and Brown).
See 104th Cong. S.735 (June 7, 1995) (As Engrossed in the Senate),
https://www.congress.gov/104/bills/s735/BILLS-104s735es.pdf. “Although Senate
Democrats and Senate Republicans introduced competing bills to establish the ATRC’s
procedures, they agreed on the court’s basic purpose.” John Dorsett Niles, Note,
Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833,
1864 (2008) (quoting Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND.
L.J. 693, 708 (1998)); see also Kopel & Olson, supra note 32, at 248 (“[A] deal was
arranged by which various provisions from the Clinton bill would be added to the Dole
bill, in exchange for White House support for the Dole bill’s provisions to sharply curtail
habeas corpus.”). Cf. 147 CONG. REC. S11581-82 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (“The Alien Terrorist Removal Court was created . . . largely through the
efforts of Senators Hatch and Dole.”), 2001 WL 1386283.
36
Other amendments would have included language that required the dismissal of any
action where an unclassified summary was deemed inadequate. See, e.g., S. Amend.
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Almost a year to the day after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate
began debating AEDPA.37 Congress passed AEDPA with broad, bipartisan
support,38 and on April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed AEDPA into law,
formally creating what would become known as the ATRC.39 In his signing
statement, President Clinton lauded the creation of the ATRC as one of “the tough
new tools to stop terrorists before they strike.”40
The ATRC statutes were revised later in 1996 as part of IIRIRA, and, among
other changes, Congress restored the possibility that removal proceedings might
proceed even if the ATRC deemed the proposed unclassified summary inadequate,
so long as certain criteria related to national security are met.41
B. Processes & Standards for Using Classified Evidence
Congress established a detailed process for ATRC removal proceedings.42
Removal proceedings under the ATRC may only be pursued when the U.S.
Department of Justice files a statutorily-obligated application, including a
certification by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, establishing,
among other things, probable cause to believe that the proposed defendant is an
alien terrorist for whom traditional removal proceedings would pose a risk to the
national security of the United States.43 Proceedings are not initiated unless an

1250 to S. Amend 1199 to S.735, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposed by Senators Specter,
Biden, Kennedy, and Simon).
37
See 142 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Senator Hatch)
(“This is a particularly relevant time to being this debate because we are fast approaching
the 1-year anniversary of the heinous crime that claimed the lives of so many men,
women, and children in Oklahoma City, OK. Indeed, this Friday, the 19th, marks the 1year anniversary of that tragedy.”).
38
AEDPA passed on a vote of 91-8 in the Senate and 293-133 in the House of
Representatives. S. 735 (104th): Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s735/details (last visited May
19, 2019).
39
The court is not referred to as the ATRC in the original legislation, but formally
adopted the name in its rules. Alien Terrorist Removal Court Rule 1, 8 U.S.C. §§ 153137.
40
William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism & Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (Apr. 24, 1996), 1996 WL 203049, at *1,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-docpg630.pdf.
41
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat.
3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). The September 1996 amendment also added the provisions in 8
U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(E) and (F) related to continuing the hearing without a summary and
appointed of a “special” cleared counsel for LPR defendants, and the provisions in
labeled “continuation of hearing without summary” § 1535(c) related to appeals in cases
where no summary was provided. See id.
42
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36.
43
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
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ATRC judge agrees that the application establishes probable cause on both points.44
These preliminary steps are done ex parte, in camera, and under seal,45 and none
of the evidence submitted can be considered by the ATRC in determining whether
to issue a removal order unless it is resubmitted in the government’s case in chief.46
In order to use classified evidence in the removal proceeding itself, the
government also must submit for the court’s review a proposed unclassified
summary that could be given to the alien defendant.47 The court, in possession of
both the classified evidence and the proposed unclassified summary, must
determine whether the summary is “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a
defense.”48 If the court finds the summary adequate, the case proceeds with the
classified evidence included as part of the government’s case in chief, but without
such information being disclosed to the alien defendant other than in the
unclassified summary.49
If the court finds the proposed summary inadequate, however, “the removal
hearing shall be terminated” unless the judge finds both that “the continued
presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause serious and irreparable
harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person,” and
“the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to
the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.”50 Where the
judge finds that both criteria are met, the removal hearing proceeds, the alien is
advised that “no summary is possible,” and the classified information is entered as
evidence for the court’s consideration.51
The removal hearing itself is open to the public and must occur “as
expeditiously as practicable.”52 The alien defendant has rights to be represented by
counsel at government expense,53 and to present evidence,54 subpoena witnesses,55
and cross-examine the government’s witnesses (except on issues related to
44

Id. § 1533(c)(2). The government may supplement its application with “information,
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a
hearing on the application. Id. § 1533(c)(1).
45
Id. § 1533(a)(2).
46
Id. § 1534(c)(5).
47
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(A), (B).
48
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
49
Id. § 1534(f), (i), (j). If the alien defendant holds permanent resident status, the ATRC
will appoint cleared counsel who can “review[] in camera the classified evidence on
behalf of the alien” and “challeng[e] through an in camera proceeding the veracity of the
evidence contained in the classified information.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F). Cleared counsel
may not, however, “disclose the [classified] information to the alien or to any other
attorney representing the alien.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii).
50
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii), (iii). The government is also provided one opportunity to
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by
the court.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii).
51
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E).
52
Id. § 1534(a).
53
Id. § 1534(c)(1).
54
Id. § 1534(c)(2).
55
Id. § 1534(d).
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classified information).56 The alien may not, however, seek to suppress evidence
on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained.57
Following the hearing, the ATRC must issue a written ruling,58 which either
party may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.59 Notably, if an alien was not provided with an unclassified summary of
the classified evidence submitted by the government, appeal is automatic60 and
findings of fact are reviewed de novo.61 All appeals are to be handled on an
expedited basis, with the court of appeals required to issue a decision within sixty
days of the ATRC’s decision.62
Notwithstanding this detailed process, the ATRC has not been used in any
way since its creation in 1996.63 Although the court has remained continuously
constituted by five federal judges, who are selected by the Chief Justice of the
United States,64 the Department of Justice has yet to submit an application for the
initiation of proceedings.65
III.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ATRC

In light of the ATRC’s complete non-use since its genesis and the
subsequent enactment of legislation implicating its potential pool of cases, the
threshold question of whether such a court is needed must be addressed.66 Indeed,
56

Id. § 1534(c)(3), (d)(1), (d)(5), and (e)(2).
Id. § 1534(e)(1)(B).
58
Id. § 1534(j). The court must redact any portion of its written decision “that would
reveal the substance or source” of classified information that was submitted in camera
and ex parte. Id.
59
Id. § 1535(c).
60
Id. § 1535(c)(2).
61
Id. § 1535(c)(4)(D).
62
Id. § 1535(c)(4).
63
See supra note 3.
64
8 U.S.C. § 1532. The current members of the court are federal district court judges
Anne Conway (M.D. Fla.), James Parker Jones (W.D. Va.), Michael Mosman (D. Or.),
Thomas Russell (W.D. Ky.), and Rosemary Collyer (D.D.C.), who serves as the court’s
chief judge. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Alien Terrorist Removal Court: Judges,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-judges (last visited April
10, 2019). All five judges currently serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Compare id., with FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court: Judges,
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20FISCR%20Judges%20May%2
02018.pdf (last visited April 10, 2019). Congress expressly suggested that this overlap
might be a smart decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (“The Chief Justice may, in the Chief
Justice’s discretion, designate the same judges under this section as are designated
pursuant to section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1803(a)).”).
65
See supra note 3.
66
Notably, the ATRC is not the only zombie federal court to have existed. For example,
in 1971, Congress created the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (based on the
prior Emergency Court of Appeals), which had “exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the decisions of the U.S. district courts in cases arising under the wage and price
57
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subsequent legislative changes to other sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) have materially changed the landscape upon which the ATRC was
originally designed. Even taking these factors into account, however, we believe
there is still a need for the ATRC as a venue for the most difficult removal cases.
The ATRC was intended to be a low-volume court.67 Congress created
numerous threshold barriers for potential cases before they would reach the ATRC.
For example, an application seeking to initiate ATRC proceedings must certify that
“removal under [conventional administrative removal proceedings before an
immigration judge] would pose a risk to the national security of the United
States.”68 Thus, cases should strictly go through conventional removal proceedings
if possible without risking the exposure of national security information.69
Congress specified that the ATRC is only to be used where the Attorney General
determines that resorting to conventional removal proceedings would jeopardize
national security.70 Moreover, given the Justice Department’s law enforcement
mission71 and the significant burden the ATRC statutes place on the most senior
Department leadership before initiation of an action,72 there is strong incentive for
the government to pursue criminal charges whenever possible.73
control program of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.” FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1971-1992,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/temporary-emergency-court-appeals-1971-1992 (last visited
July 21, 2019) . That court was abolished in 1992. Id. And in 1973, Congress created
the Special Railroad Court, “which facilitated the consolidation and management of
several railroads undergoing bankruptcy reorganization.” FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Special
Railroad Court, 1974-1997, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/special-railroad-court-19741997 (last visited July 21, 2019). The Special Railroad Court was abolished in 1997. Id.
The authors are unware, however, of any other Article III court that, like the ATRC, has
never heard a case and has not been abolished. It bears noting, however, that the FISA
Review Court heard its first case more than 20 years after its creation. See In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting that this case was the first appeal
to the Court of Review since the passage of FISA in 1978). Theoretically, it is possible
that the ATRC is simply a once-every-twenty-five-years court and its time for use has not
yet come.
67
See, e.g., Andrew Becker, Terrorist Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, CAL.
WATCH: PUBLIC SAFETY–DAILY REPORT (Apr. 12, 2012), https://archive.ph/v0ga3
(archived version) (citing DOJ officials as indicating “the court was intended to be low
volume, as most suspected foreign terrorists can be removed without the use of classified
evidence”).
68
8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OUR MISSION STATEMENT, https://www.justice.gov/about (last
visited July 21, 2019).
72
8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii) (requiring “certification by the Attorney General or the
Deputy Attorney General”).
73
Notably, however, conviction and removal are not mutually exclusive; an alien
convicted of a terrorism offense who serves out his or her criminal sentence is likely
removable, see Id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(iii) (aggravated felony), (a)(3) (terrorist activity), and
1101(f) (43) (listing aggravated felonies), and presumably, removal proceedings will be
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Significant legislative reforms have undeniably narrowed the scope of
potential cases necessitating utilization of the ATRC. In September 1996, five
months after creating the ATRC, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).74 IIRIRA modified the process for
removal proceedings to require that a respondent placed in conventional
administrative removal proceedings has the initial burden to lawful admission by
an immigration officer, or if he cannot prove prior admission to the United States,
to prove that he is admissible to the United States.75 Only if the individual proves
lawful admission does the burden shift to the government to prove removability
from the United States.76 Notably, the government may introduce and rely on
classified information that the immigration court reviews ex parte and in camera in
circumstances where the noncitizen argues that he is admissible at the time of
commencement of the conventional removal proceedings rather than some previous
admission.77 Thus, IIRIRA erected a key threshold barrier for potential ATRC
cases by making it easier to use conventional removal proceedings in situations
where the respondent was never inspected.78 Importantly, however, the IIRIRA
amendments did not provide the ability to rely ex parte on classified evidence to
establish removability of a subclass of noncitizens, lawful permanent residents
(LPR).
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of “engage in
terrorist activity” under the INA.79 The PATRIOT Act amendments further
impacted the pool of potential ATRC cases by modifying the lack-of-knowledge
defense to ensure that individuals who provided material support to a terrorist
organization, regardless of their claimed subjective belief concerning the intended
purpose for such support, could be found to have engaged in terrorist activity and
be removable.80 Thus, a wider range of conduct, some of which might be provable
without needing to rely on classified evidence, would support conventional removal
proceedings on terrorism-related grounds.
initiated against such individuals in most if not all cases, see, e.g., Meskini v. Att’y Gen.,
No. 4:14-cv-42, 2018 WL 1321576 (M.D. Ga. March 14, 2018) (discussing postincarceration efforts to remove individual convicted of terrorism-related offenses).
74
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3546 (Sept. 30, 1996).
75
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2).
76
Id. § 1229a(c)(3).
77
Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (“. . . these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such
national security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien’s
admission to the United States or to an application by the alien for discretionary relief
under this chapter”). Notably, the government may rely on classified evidence in all
conventional removal proceedings to oppose an alien’s request for forms of discretionary
relief from removal. Id.
78
See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98 (“A major reason for the lack of use of the
ATRC was that new immigration laws permitted the use of classified evidence in
traditional deportation hearings, making recourse to a special court unnecessary.”).
79
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(2002).
80
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
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The IIRIRA and PATRIOT Act provided additional law enforcement tools
that reduced the pool of potential cases in which the ATRC might be needed.81
Notwithstanding, we believe there is continuing need for the ATRC in relation to a
specific type of case: LPRs for whom the only viable removal charge is based on
terrorism activity that can only be proven by reliance on national security
information that cannot be declassified.82 Indeed, removal of terrorist LPRs was
likely the “main impetus of the ATRC.”83
Importantly, LPR defendants—which, at this point, are likely to be the only
defendants due to the availability of other criminal and civil enforcement tools—
are entitled to additional procedural protections that are not available to other
noncitizens if there is no unclassified summary provided.84 These include courtappointed, government-funded cleared counsel who is entitled to review the
underlying classified information and challenge it on the merits.85 This is similar
to the procedural rights afforded by the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) context,86 and like the classified information accessed under a CIPA
protective order, such attorney is prohibited from disclosing any of the classified
information to the defendant.87
Moreover, LPR terrorists present a real threat according to data on terrorist
attacks by foreign-born individuals.88 A 2019 Cato Institute report found that
foreign-born terrorists were responsible for at least 86 percent (or 3,037) of the
3,518 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of
81

See, e.g., ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98. We note that it is it is theoretically
possible that the PATRIOT Act’s expanded definition language might qualify more cases
for ATRC consideration.
82
See, e.g., Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling Classified Evidence and A Petitioner’s Right to
A “Meaningful Review" at Guantánamo Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2669, 2708 (2009) (noting that, theoretically, “the ATRC could be used to remove
residents currently within the country and also permanent residents entering at a border
where the government has secret evidence against them”).
83
Blum, supra note 18, at 685 (“the main impetus of the ATRC appears to be deporting
LPRs who are engaging in terrorist activity . . .); id. at 691 (“Congress presumably
created the ATRC to deal with LPRs charged under terrorist grounds of deportability.”).
84
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1534.
85
Id. One scholar has argued that this provision renders the classified evidence “nonsecret.” See Niles, supra note 35, at 1860 (arguing that where cleared counsel is provided
and allowed to review the classified evidence, e.g. where the case involves an LPR, “the
evidence is not secret . . .[a]lthough the resident alien does not view the secret evidence
personally, for the purposes of cross-examining the evidence the alien may fairly be said
to view it constructively through the eyes of the special attorney.”).
86
Lorr, supra note 82, at 2710 (“As in CIPA, the attorney cannot disclose the classified
information to the alien.”).
87
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (ATRC non-disclosure provision); 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 3
(CIPA non-disclosure provision).
88
See Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status & Nationality: A Risk Analysis,
1975–2017, 866 POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato Institute, Wash., D.C.), May 7, 2019, at 1-2,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorists-immigration-statusnationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017.
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2017.89 The report also found that there were “192 foreign-born terrorists who
planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 1975 through
2017.”90 The most common category of immigration status for the foreign-born
terrorists was LPR; indeed “[m]ore terrorists have taken advantage of the LPR
category than of any other visa category.”91 Thus, contrary to what might be
expected, “[m]ost foreign-born terrorists often live [in the United States] peacefully
for years before concocting their schemes,”92 and it is important to have a tool to
remove such individuals where the government discovers—and classified evidence
shows—that they are engaging in terrorist activity, including planning an attack.
The ATRC is also necessary to utilize specific types of evidence without
compromising the underlying sources. Most notably, the ATRC statutes waive the
requirement of notice to a defendant where the government intends to use evidence
that is “obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance” under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).93 This varies from the general rule requiring
such notice, which otherwise applies in every “trial, hearing, or other proceeding in
or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority
of the United States.”94 Similarly, using the ATRC may be necessary for cases
involving evidence that was collected by a foreign government, particularly by
human intelligence sources, and shared with the United States.95 Thus, using such
evidence in a criminal case or as part of the case-in-chief in conventional removal
proceedings for an LPR would require disclosing its existence, which “can pose an
obstacle to future cooperation between the United States and the foreign
government.”96 Often, evidence obtained via the intelligence of a foreign
government is provided to the United States with the caveat that such evidence and
89

See id. An additional “68 were murdered by unidentified terrorists.” Id.
Id. at 3 (notably, the report “counts terrorists who were discovered trying to enter the
United States on a forged passport or visa as illegal immigrants”). By contrast, there
were “788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S.
soil from 1975 through 2017.” Id. That said, there is no method for removing a naturalborn terrorist.
91
Id. at 2, 6, 21. The Cato Report notes, however, that the odds of an individual being
killed on U.S. soil by a foreign-born terrorist are highest for individuals present in the
United States on a tourist visa, because 18 of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were in that status.
Id. at 6. Moreover, “[t]errorist with green cards came from 30 different countries.” Id. at
21.
92
Id. at 2.
93
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1); see also Harkenrider, supra note 7, at 150 (“the suspected alien
terrorist is not entitled to any information gathered under FISA”). Indeed, the defendant
is even prohibited from learning of the source for such information via other discovery. 8
U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(C).
94
50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
95
Yu, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that “government or foreign personnel—that are
clearly not law enforcement—largely gather the evidence in terrorism cases”).
96
Trying Terrorists in Article III Courts Challenges & Lessons Learned, AM. BAR ASS’N
STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SEC. at 16 (July 2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/trying_terrorists_artI
II_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf.
90
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cooperation remains secret.97 And where the evidence comes from a witness who
is a foreign intelligence agent or human source, the foreign government may simply
refuse to allow the witness to testify.98 Foreign governments do not always follow
the same protocols as United States law enforcement when collecting evidence.99
Importantly, regardless of how the United States obtained the evidence, the ATRC
will not entertain motions by the defendant to suppress the evidence.100
Finally, maintaining the ATRC is generally a cost neutral proposition.101
The five judges who serve on the ATRC do so as a collateral responsibility and do
not receive additional compensation.102 The ATRC has no budget or staff, and
“exists without a website or even a physical meeting place.”103 The court’s
procedures were enacted decades ago and remain in place, waiting for the moment
when the court is called into action.104 To the extent there is any cost, it is
substantially outweighed by the “human costs of LPR terrorism” which one
estimate totals as $255 million over a 43 year period ending in 2017.105
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

A commonly advanced hypothesis to explain the ATRC’s non-utilization is
the lack of certainty regarding the constitutionality of the court’s adjudicatory
procedures under the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee.106 While debate
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 15.
100
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B). This elimination of the evidentiary exclusionary rule also
covers challenges to chain of custody where essential links in the chain are classified.
Yu, supra note 21, at 16. Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence, including the hearsay
rules, do not apply. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(h).
101
Robert Sorrell, Federal Judge in Abingdon One of 12 to Serve on Never-used Court to
Remove Terrorists, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (March 17, 2019) (citing a spokesperson
for the Administration Office of the U.S. Courts). But see Emily C. Kendall, The Alien
Terrorist Removal Court & Other National Security Measures You May Have Never
Heard of: The Need for Comprehensive National Security Reform, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 253, 269–70 (2011) (arguing, without support, that “disbanding the ATRC . . . will
also save money” because it is an “institution that wastes money, manpower, and
resources that could be put to much better use in other facets of homeland security”).
102
Sorrell, supra note 101 (citing a spokesperson for the Administration Office of the
U.S. Courts); Becker, supra note 67.
103
Opinion: Our View: Special Court Has Never Seen a Case. It Never Should, BRISTOL
HERALD COURIER (March 30, 2019).
104
Alien Terrorist Removal Court Rules, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37.
105
See Nowrasteh, supra note 88, at 22.
106
See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 856 (4th ed. 2007) (“It
may be that constitutional doubts about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this
special court are why the government has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 18, at 703
(“Many scholars have argued that the ATRC deprives aliens of procedural due process
under the Fifth Amendment; hence, its non-use may reflect a fear that if it was used to
remove aliens based on classified evidence, it may be struck down as unconstitutional.”);
id. at 704-10 (reviewing arguments made against constitutionality of ATRC); Niles,
98
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on that topic is to be expected because the statutory scheme has never been
judicially tested, we view such explanation as incomplete because it does not
meaningfully consider or examine the type of nuance that we explore in this
article.107 The United States has proven itself willing to test the due process muster
of its various national security or immigration enforcement tools.108 Presumably, a
number of circumstances have arisen since the AEDPA’s passage that would justify
risking constitutional challenges to the statute or to the court by using it. Indeed,
the 9/11 Commission staff report indicates that at least 100 cases had been referred
to and reviewed by the Justice Department for possible ATRC proceedings.109 The
report acknowledges that many of the potential cases were “overwhelmed” by “the
procedural complexities,” or “stalled by internal Justice Department deliberations”
related to, among other things, the risk to the underlying classified information,
which FBI refused to make available for prosecution purposes.110
Accordingly, we conclude that the non-use of the ATRC is due to
procedural hurdles erected by the original legislation.111 In particular, the dual
findings required for the ATRC to authorize the use of classified evidence without
an unclassified summary of such evidence impose an unworkably high burden on
the government, preventing use of the ATRC for exactly the type of cases that it

supra note 35, at 1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the ATRC’s constitutionality, the
attorney general has never used the court.”).
107
See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98 (noting numerous reasons why cases were
not pursued, including “procedural complexities that soon overwhelmed these terrorist
cases”).
108
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (concluding that the
government’s detention of a U.S. citizen and unlawful enemy combatant violated the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18 (2003)
(detention of criminal alien did not violate Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). Cf.
Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html
(discussing killing of United States citizen in Yemen by drone strike).
109
See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 97-98 (“by 1998, Justice attorneys in the
Terrorism and Violent Crime Section had led a department review of 50 cases for
possible application to the ATRC, but they were all rejected. Over the following two
years, another 50 cases were rejected.”).
110
See ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 98. The 9/11 Commission Staff’s report was
based, among other things, on interviews in 2003 with former INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner and Dan Cadman and Laura Baxter, who worked for INS’s National Security
Unit, which was then responsible for case referrals to the ATRC. Id. at 96, 98. Notably,
some potential ATRC cases also stalled because of internal deliberations regarding “alien
rights and sufficiency of evidence.” Id. at 98.
111
Cf. David A. Martin, Prevention Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy
Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 328 (2004) (Transcription of David
Martin’s testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, December 8, 2003) (“To date the ATRC has not been used, probably owing to the
very narrow range of circumstances that come within its jurisdiction—a statutory
restriction that is not well understood.”); Valentine, supra note 17, at 1-2 (“the statutory
restraints on the [ATRC] make it effectively useless”).
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was intended to hear.112 Additionally, the unique and imprecise standard that
describes the threat posed by publicly disclosing necessary classified evidence
severely diminishes the utility of the ATRC statutes as a prosecutorial tool.113
These barriers should be acknowledged and legislatively corrected to render the
ATRC a viable forum for appropriate cases, as originally intended.114
A. The dual findings necessary to utilize classified information where
no adequate summary is possible should be alternative options.
The ATRC was created so that the federal government could introduce
classified evidence in support of its effort to remove noncitizens engaged in terrorist
activity while preserving the classified nature of that evidence and its sources.115
As discussed above, the government can only introduce classified evidence in the
ATRC removal proceeding in two circumstances.116 First, classified evidence can
be admitted where the ATRC deems the government’s proposed unclassified
112

147 CONG. REC. S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (“I have
been informed that the notice requirements and other procedural obstacles that force the
Federal Government to disclose classified information just basically renders the ATRC
useless.”), 2001 WL 1386283; 147 CONG. REC. S11579 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Smith) (noting that, based on discussions with the U.S. Attorney
General, “the Justice Department has used the court, as I said before, not once—not even
one time—to deport any alien terrorist or suspected alien terrorist. Again, the reason is
because they have to compromise their sources and methods to do it. . . . The intelligence
community gets this, and they cannot act on it because to act on it would compromise
their own people and their methods of collection. To not act on it means they stay here.
So that is where we are. That is why not one case has been brought to court since my
legislation created it in 1996.”). But see 147 CONG. REC. S11582 (daily ed. Nov. 8,
2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (indicating that, based on his discussion with the
Department of Justice, the ATRC’s non-use “is not because an unclassified summary has
to be provided to the defendant” and he did not understand the Justice Department to be
seeking a blanket exception to providing an unclassified summary), 2001 WL 1386283.
113
See Edward T. Pound & Chitra Ragavan, Finger-Pointing, Fingerprints: The Hunt for
Evidence and, Hard On Its Heels, Charges About Who Screwed Up, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 1,
2001), reprinted in Congressional Record at 147 CONG. REC. S11580 (daily ed. Nov. 8,
2001) (“Former Justice Department officials say the agency couldn’t use the [ATRC]
because the law requires disclosure of sensitive information to terrorists—evidence, they
say, that would compromise intelligence gathering and identify sources.”), 2001 WL
1386283.
114
As a threshold point and notwithstanding questions of judicial deference doctrine
applicability or the congressional Article III court creation authority, the Justice
Department lacks the authority to regulate to remedy some of these and other issues
because the ATRC statutes—as they relate to judicial administration and standards—are
not organic to the Department. See, e.g., Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
115
Beall, supra note 35, at 708.
116
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3). This is specific to the removal hearing itself, as opposed to the
application for the initiation of such a proceeding. See id. § 1533(c).
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summary to be “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense.”117 Second,
even where the court finds the proposed summary inadequate, it can nonetheless
admit the classified information into evidence if it makes certain findings.118 It is
those findings that pose one of the biggest barriers to the use of the ATRC.
By statute, the ATRC can only admit classified information into evidence
without the provision of an unclassified summary if it determines that “(I) the
continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any
person, and (II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any
person.”119 Because the statute uses the conjunctive “and,” the ATRC must find
that both (I) and (II) are satisfied.
It would be imprudent for the government to begin the ATRC process in
precedent-setting circumstances when it is not reasonably confident that it will be
able to rely on the very classified evidence that warrants the use of such venue from
the start.120 It would be rare that the government can rest assured that its proposed
summary will be deemed adequate.121 If such a summary were sufficiently specific,
117

Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii).
119
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii), (iii). The government is also provided one opportunity to
revise the unclassified summary in an attempt to “correct the deficiencies identified by
the court.” Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(ii).
120
Although many aspects of the ATRC process are similar to the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA), see Blum, supra note 18, at 739 n.9, the two are analytical
distinct and used for very different purposes. CIPA, which applies only to criminal cases,
see CIPA, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025 (1980) (“An Act to provide certain
pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified
information.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, No. 12-cv-1905,
2015 WL 1021118, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2015) (“CIPA is reserved for criminal cases”),
is intended to allow the government to know what classified information must be
produced in discovery and may come in at trial, id. (“CIPA provides criminal procedures
that permit a trial judge to rule on the relevance or admissibility of classified information
in a secure setting”); 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 4, 6, 8. Unlike the ATRC, CIPA does not
allow the introduction of evidence in the case in chief to which the Defendant does not
personally have access. Id. § 6; Lorr, supra note 82, at 2712 (“immigration is the only
area of the law where absolutely secret evidence is permitted as evidence in an
adversarial setting”); id. at 2700 (“CIPA does not allow a jury to see any information that
the defendant himself cannot see.”).
In 2001, Rep. David Bonior unsuccessfully proposed legislation that would have
made CIPA applicable to immigration proceedings, including proceedings in the ATRC.
See Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001, H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. (2001).
121
Niles, supra note 35, at 1857. As Niles notes, the “adequate summary” requirement is
“unrealistic” in most cases that would end up at the ATRC. Id. Indeed, a case has only
made it to that stage after the Attorney General found, and an Article III judge agreed,
there is probable cause to believe the defendant is an “alien terrorist” and that
conventional removal proceedings would pose a risk to the national security. Id.; 8
U.S.C. § 1533; see also Beall, supra note 35, at 707 (arguing “[i]t is also unclear how
detailed the summary must be” as it appears to be left entirely to judicial discretion).
118
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it would risk revealing to the alien or others the government’s classified
information, sources, and potentially methods of collection.122 This results in a
Catch-22, which one former high-level Department of Justice official has
described:
If the government prepares an unclassified summary of the evidence
that is too vague and general, it will not be approved by the Judge.
If, on the other hand, the evidence is too clear and specific, the
classified evidence itself will be effectively disclosed, thus harming
national security by compromising sources and methods of
intelligence gathering.123
Given this Catch-22 and the very real likelihood that it will be unable to
share enough information for the ATRC to deem the summary adequate, before
initiating a case, the Department of Justice must determine whether it can satisfy
the standard for proceeding without an adequate unclassified summary.124 Meeting
both prongs of that standard, however, imposes an untenable burden on the
government.125 The government must show not only that the information is
properly classified at a very high level (finding II),126 but also that allowing the
alien to remain in the United States would cause “serious and irreparable harm” to
the national security or grave physical harm to another person (finding I).

122

See Niles, supra note 35, at 1857; see also 147 CONG. REC. S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8,
2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (attributing non-use of the ATRC to the statute’s notice
provision “that render the court ineffective and useless”: “[The Federal Government and
intelligence community] are damned if they do and damned if they don’t because if they
provide the information, they compromise their own sources and methods. If they don’t
provide it, we can’t deport them.”), 2001 WL 1386283.
123
Valentine, supra note 17, at 1-2. From 1988 to 1993, Valentine served in the Reagan
and George H.W. Bush Administrations as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation. See id.
124
Kendall, supra note 101, at 269 (noting that the ATRC was designed to allow the
government to avoid having “to choose between allowing the alien’s continued stay in
the U.S., which threatens national security, or to disclose its reasons for initiating the
alien’s deportation, a disclosure which in itself could endanger the country.”).
125
See Proposed Amendment 2114 to Senate Bill 1428, 147 CONG. REC. S11630-31
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (proposing amendment to the ATRC statutes to allow for use of
classified information without any requirement for an unclassified summary, concluding
“[t]he [ATRC] has never been used because the United States is required to submit for
judicial approval an unclassified summary of the classified evidence against the alien. If
too general, this summary will be disapproved by the Judge. If too specific, this
summary will compromise the underlying classified information.”); 147 CONG. REC.
S11577 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 2001) (statement by Sen. Smith) (“The reason for [the ATRC’s
non-use] is we are required under the law to submit to the terrorists a summary of the
intelligence we gathered on him and how we got it. Obviously, if the terrorist gets that
information, then the people who provided that information are going to be killed or their
lives will be at risk.”), 2001 WL 1386283; 147 CONG. REC. S11631 (daily ed. Nov. 8,
2001), 2001 WL 1386320.
126
See infra Section IV.B discussing the lack of clarity regarding the level of
classification required.
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Consider two illustrative hypothetical fact patterns of possible ATRC
candidate cases that would ultimately fail due to the conjunctive finding
requirement:
Hypothetical Case 1
Suppose the government had FISA-obtained information classified at the
Top Secret level—utilized only where disclosure of the information would result in
exceptionally grave damage to the national security—indicating that the alien
defendant was raising funds for a new terrorist organization that has stated its
intention to attack U.S. citizens abroad, and has what appears to be a viable plan
for doing so, but whose immediate capabilities are non-existent or seriously in
question.127 Such information would likely satisfy required finding II because of
the damage that would likely be caused by revealing the classified information or
source, but it might not establish that the alien’s continued presence in the United
States “would likely” result in serious and irreparable damage to the United States
or an individual (required finding I).
Hypothetical Case 2
Conversely, suppose the government had information obtained other than
from a human source and classified at the Secret level—utilized where disclosure
of the information would result in serious damage to the national security—
indicating that the alien defendant was intending to physically attack a senior
official at a foreign country’s mission to the United Nations in New York City.128
Such information would likely satisfy required finding I because of the danger to
the individual, but arguably not required finding II because the classification level
of the evidence would indicate that disclosure of such information is not expected
to rise to the level of “serious and irreparable” damage.
Both hypotheticals assume that the dispositive evidence cannot not be
declassified and that traditional administrative removal proceedings are not viable,
and thus, present as the type of cases that the ATRC was created to handle. It seems
inappropriate to force the government to make a Hobson’s choice between (a)
allowing such individuals to remain in the United States and dedicating substantial
law enforcement resources to monitor their activity or (b) disclosing the classified
information (and perhaps burning the underlying methods or sources) in order to
seek the terrorist-alien’s removal.129
127

This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
128
This would likely constitute “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(III)
given the employee’s status as an “internationally protected person.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1116(b)(4).
129
Cf. 141 CONG. REC. S7480 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Senator Orrin
Hatch) (“[The] success of our counter-terrorism efforts depends on the effective use of
classified information used to infiltrate foreign terrorist groups. We cannot afford to turn
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To render the ATRC workable, Congress should revise 8 U.S.C.
§ 1354(e)(3)(D)(iii) so that either finding would allow the removal hearing to move
forward without a summary. Replacing the conjunctive “and” with the disjunctive
“or” would increase the likelihood that the Department of Justice will utilize the
ATRC for the most serious removal cases. Such change would make the above
hypothetical cases viable cases for ATRC consideration as a statutory and practical
administration matter.
Moreover, changing the statute to the disjunctive comports with the version
of the bills originally introduced by President Clinton and several senior Democrat
Senators.130 Both of those bills provided that the removal hearing could proceed
without a summary if the ATRC found:
(A) the continued presence of the alien in the United States, or
(B) the provision of the required summary would likely cause
serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death or
serious bodily injury to any person.131
Thus, the original proposals by the Democrat Senators required the ATRC to make
either Finding I or Finding II, not both.
The legislative history is unclear how the findings ended up being written
in the conjunctive, which appears to have occurred when Republican leadership
incorporated a more robust version of the ATRC provisions into the bill originally
proposed by Senator Dole one week after the Oklahoma City bombing.
Regardless of whether the findings were required in the conjunctive by way
of a drafting error or intentionally, revising them to be disjunctive alternatives
would be a serious step toward addressing “the Catch-22 situation that has crippled
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.”132
B. The classification level for evidence deemed sufficient to proceed
without a summary is unclear and should be revised.
As shown above, in most if not all cases, the ATRC will be required to
determine whether the government has made the showing required to proceed
without an unclassified summary. In addition to imposing too heavy of a burden
over these secrets in open court, jeopardizing both the future success of these programs
and the lives of those who carry them out.”), 1995 WL 317140.
130
See S.390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (introduced on behalf of President Clinton) (using
disjunctive “or”); 141 CONG. REC. S2508 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (section-by-section
analysis) (using disjunctive “or”); S.761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (introduced by five
Democratic Senators) (using disjunctive “or”); 141 CONG. REC. S6206 (daily ed. May 5,
1995) (section-by-section analysis) (using disjunctive “or”). The Reagan Administrationsponsored bill that originally sought to create a special alien-terrorist court likewise
allowed for proof in the disjunctive. See 137 CONG. REC. S1187 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991)
(“if necessary to prevent serious harm to the national security or death or serious bodily
injury to any person, a statement informing the alien that no such summary is possible.”)
(emphasis added), 1991 WL 6968, 88.
131
See S.390, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2) (emphasis added); S.761, 104th Cong. § 502(e)(2)
(emphasis added).
132
Valentine, supra note 17, at 3.
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on the government, see supra Part II.A, the current statutory scheme uses language
that has no clear legal analogue to describe the risk to the national security posed
by the release of specific evidence.
Specifically, § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii) uses the phrase “serious and irreparable
harm to the national security,” a novel phrase in the United States Code that does
not appear in any court decision.133 Utilization of such an untethered standard
creates a framework that lacks clarity for both the Department of Justice and the
ATRC, and further impairs the viability of the court. To remedy this situation and
render the ATRC a viable venue, Congress should revise the statute to utilize its
preferred classification level.
“Since World War I, the Executive Branch has engaged in efforts to protect
national security information by means of a classification system graded according
to sensitivity.”134 In 1951, President Harry S. Truman extended the classification
system from the military to civilian departments and agencies of the federal
government, and created the familiar classification levels of “top secret,” “secret,”
and “confidential.”135 And since at least 1978, the United States has used the same
standards for classifying evidence at each of those levels.136 Given the durability
and consistency of their use, the standards are now well-established in both
executive branch operations and in case law. This familiarity renders workable
executive determinations on classification, and judicial review of such
determinations.
In direct contrast to the well-established standards for classification levels,
the ATRC statutes utilize the phrase “serious and irreparable harm to the national
security.”137 This combination of words has only been used in the ATRC statute.138
133

The only other context in which we have located this phrase is in U.S. Department of
Justice Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee’s testimony to the U.S. House of
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 regarding the committee’s
release of classified information. U.S. Intelligence Agencies & Activities: Performance of
the Intelligence Community Hearing Before the H. Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th
Cong. at 679 (1975),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000012936663;view=1up;seq=55 (statement of
Asst. Att’y Gen. Rex E. Lee, Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice) (“In addition, the release of
classified information such as the Committee has done, and has stated it will continue to
do, causes serious and irreparable harm to the national security and foreign relations of
the United States.”). This statement did not require judicial application of the standard.
134
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (citing Developments in the Law:
The National Security Interest & Civil Liberties – III. Information Security:
Classification of Government Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1193-94 (1972)).
135
See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 24, 1951); Developments in the
Law: The National Security Interest & Civil Liberties – III. Information Security:
Classification of Government Documents, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1972).
136
See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (June 28, 1978); Exec. Order No.
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874 (Apr. 2, 1982); Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825
(Apr. 17, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
137
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
138
The closest phrasing the authors located in a statutory or Article III context was a line
in a brief filed on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy. See Brief of Federal Defendants-
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Though standing alone, the “serious and irreparable harm” standard aligns with the
equitable standard for issuing a preliminary injunction,139 its application to the more
nebulous concept of “national security” is less clear than its application to a specific
organization or individual.140
Moreover, the language used to describe the harm to the national security is
also in direct contrast to the utilization of a well-established standard with regard
to the harm that would be caused to an individual. The ATRC statutes allow for
the use of classified evidence without a summary if the court determines that both
the “continued presence of the alien in the United States” and “the provision of [an
adequate] summary would likely cause . . . death or serious bodily injury to any
person.”141 The “death or serious bodily injury” standard is relatively simple to
apply. “Death,” of course, is self-explanatory. And “serious bodily injury” is a
term that is defined elsewhere in federal statutes,142 and in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.143 It is a familiar, discernible standard that can be applied to determine
whether the government has adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the ATRC
standards with regard to the risk posed to an individual.
Legislative revision would bring similar predictability and uniformity to
ATRC’s standard for the type of harm posed to the national security. In light of the
well-established classification level standards and the nature of the court, Congress
would be well served to utilize the language that has become so ingrained in the
national security framework. The application of these standards would permit the
Appellants at 18, Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 07-56157), 2007 WL 3069208 (“The district court then dismissed in a single
sentence the evidence showing that a preliminary injunction would cause serious and
irreparable harm to the Navy and national security.”).
139
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking
a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
140
“National security” is statutorily defined within the ATRC statutes to broadly mean
“the national defense and foreign relations of the United States,” a definition incorporated
from the Classified Information Protection Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (incorporating 18
U.S.C. App. 3 § 1). Cf. AMOS A. JORDAN ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 4
(6th ed. 2009) (noting the multiple principles covered by the term “national security” and
stating that “[p]reserving the national security of the United States requires safeguarding
individual freedoms and other U.S. values, as well as the laws and institutions established
to protect them”).
141
8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
142
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (“(3) the term ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury
which involves--(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted
and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”); 21 U.S.C. § 802 (“(25) The term “serious
bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves--(A) a substantial risk of death; (B)
protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (C) protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”). Notably, the definition of 18
U.S.C. § 1365 is expressly incorporated elsewhere into at least one other section of Title
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii).
143
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M).
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Department of Justice sufficient predictability in assessing whether the classified
information in support of removing the potential defendant is of the type intended
by Congress to justify proceeding without an unclassified summary.144
As noted above, the ATRC statutes use the phrase “serious and irreparable
harm to the national security.”145 That standard appears to exist somewhere
between the standards for classifying evidence as “Secret” (“serious damage”) and
“Top Secret” (“exceptionally grave damage”).146 In light of Congress’ original
drafting choice, we suggest that the classification standard for Secret be used. This
would facilitate the United States’ non-disclosure of information that would pose
serious damage to the national security to the public and to a defendant for whom
the Attorney General and an Article III judge on the ATRC have already found
probable cause to believe is an alien terrorist.147 This is a functional solution,
particularly in light of the fact that the alien defendant may be entitled to
government-financed, cleared counsel who will be able to review the classified
evidence against the defendant,148 and automatic expedited appeal under a de novo
standard of review.149
C. Other revisions to better-enumerate Congress’s intent.
While making the foregoing critical changes to the ATRC statutes,
Congress should also utilize the opportunity to clarify its original intent with certain
clarifications.
i. Clarifying that classified evidence is appropriate for consideration
on the merits.
The ATRC statutes should be modified to make clear that classified
evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review is properly part
of the basis for the court’s removal decision.150 The ability to introduce classified
evidence in support of removal is the ATRC’s raison d’être.151 As currently
144

The United States always retains the ability to declassify evidence, where appropriate,
if it decides that removal is important and the evidence does not rise to the level for
proceeding without an unclassified summary. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A).
145
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
146
See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
147
8 U.S.C. § 1533.
148
Id. § 1534(c)(1), (e)(3)(F).
149
Id. § 1535(c)(2), (4)(D).
150
Id. § 1534(c)(5).
151
See Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 47 (2001),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=2388 (statement of Jeanne A. Butterfield, American
Immigration Lawyers Association on Oct. 17, 2001) (“[T]he new Alien Terrorist
Removal Procedures. . . were designed to allow the government to conduct deportation
hearings with the use of secret evidence.”); ELDRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 97 (“the
Alien Terrorist Removal Court [was] expressly designed to remove alien terrorists by
using classified evidence to support a terrorist allegation and by staffed by counsel
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drafted, however, the court’s reliance upon such information seems intended but is
unclear; providing only that “[t]he decision of the judge regarding removal shall be
based only on the evidence introduced at the removal hearing.152 Notably that
“removal hearing” is “open to public.”153 But Congress provided elsewhere that
the ATRC’s written “decision as to whether the alien shall be removed” should be
only be made publicly available after appropriate redactions have been made.154
Thus, Congress contemplated that the court would receive classified evidence in
support of removal in camera and ex parte, and be able to rely on such information
in making its removal determination.155 Accordingly, we propose the inclusion of
similar language to clarify that consideration of such information is proper.
Specifically, Congress should include the phrase “and all classified evidence
submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review” at the end of the
subparagraph delineating the evidence that can be relied upon in making the
removal decision.156
ii. Clarifying that the ATRC should be evaluating the risk posted by
disclosure of an “adequate summary,” which would include
disclosure of classified information.
The reference to “summary” in the subsection establishing the standard for
when the government can proceed without the provision of an unclassified
summary should be clarified.157 It refers to “the summary,” which is unclear
because the subsection applies only in the context where the government has
possessing the security clearances necessary to review classified evidence”); Alien
Terrorist Removal Court, 45 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 55 (Sept. 1997),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/01/11/usab4505.pdf (“[The]
ATRC is designed to allow the United States to deport alien terrorists on the basis of
classified information without having to disclose that information to the alien or the
public.”); Martin, supra note 111, at 316 (“Only since 1996 has the government been
authorized to use confidential information as part of the case in chief supporting
removability of an admitted alien, and only in the context of unique proceedings before a
special tribunal known as the Alien Terrorist Removal Court”).
152
8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(5). This is in contrast to the provision allowing the ATRC to base
its initial probable cause determination on such evidence. Id. § 1533(a)(1) (“In
determining whether to grant an application under this section, a single judge of the
removal court may consider, ex parte and in camera, in addition to the information
contained in the application—(A) other information, including classified information
. . .”).
153
Id. § 1534(a)(2).
154
Id. § 1534(j) (“Any portion of the order that would reveal the substance or source of
information received in camera and ex parte pursuant to subsection (e) shall not be made
available to the alien or the public.”).
155
Id.
156
Id. § 1534(c)(5).
157
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) (“The findings described in this clause are, with respect to
an alien, that— . . .(II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any
person.”).
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proposed an unclassified summary (i.e. one which would not pose such a risk)158
which the ATRC has determined to be inadequate.159 The language should be
revised to say “an adequate summary” to capture Congress’s intent that the ATRC
evaluate the risk posed to the national security by producing a summary that would
be adequate (i.e., one that would likely contain classified information).
iii. Correcting clerical errors in statutory language and cross
references.
Any legislation to address the issues discussed in this article should also
include provisions to correct several errors of a clerical nature. Specifically, the
cross-reference in § 1535(c)(4)(D) providing for de novo review of factual findings
where a defendant was not provided with a summary of the classified evidence
should be corrected so that it refers to the section of § 1534 that actually addresses
that possibility.160 Likewise, § 1534 should be revised to use the singular
“proceeding” rather than the plural form, and to maintain uniformity in how it refers
to forms of ancillary relief that are unavailable in ATRC proceedings.161
D. This legislative proposal for changes to the ATRC is likely
constitutional.
The only actual determinant of constitutionality of the ATRC would be
judicial review—which would likely culminate with Supreme Court review—of an
as-applied challenge to ATRC proceedings. Much of the literature that examines
the ATRC concludes that the court may be susceptible to Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause vulnerability.162 Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to guarantee whether

158

Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (“With respect to such information, the Government shall submit
to the removal court an unclassified summary of the specific evidence that does not pose
that risk.”).
159
See generally id. § 1534(e)(3)(D).
160
See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(4)(D). Compare id. § 1534(c)(3) (addressing a defendant’s
“[r]ights in hearing”) with id. § 1534(e)(3) (addressing “[t]reatment of classified
information” and situations in which case can proceed without summary).
161
See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (using plural “proceedings” where sentence structure calls for
singular “proceeding”), (k) (including adverb “by” in context where it makes no logical
sense and is inconsistent with other disjunctive subsections).
162
See, e.g., DYCUS ET AL., supra note 106, at 856 (“It may be that constitutional doubts
about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special court are why the
government has never used it.”); Blum, supra note 18, at 703 (“Many scholars have
argued that the ATRC deprives aliens of procedural due process under the Fifth
Amendment; hence, its non-use may reflect a fear that if it was used to remove aliens
based on classified evidence, it may be struck down as unconstitutional.”); id. at 704-10
(reviewing arguments made against constitutionality of ATRC); Niles, supra note 35, at
1837 (“Perhaps out of fear about the ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has
never used the court.”). Cf. Zachery, supra note 22, at 294 (“The [ATRC] is an
amalgamation of statutes which are independently constitutional . . . select[ing]
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a novel specialty court that literally considers “secret” (or “top secret”) evidence ex
parte is constitutional.163 However, there are strong arguments in favor of the
ATRC’s ability to withstand Fifth Amendment due process scrutiny that are not
adversely affected by our proposal, especially as it applies to LPRs, the principal
class of noncitizen terrorists for which we think the ATRC is still required
following the passage of IIRIRA and the PATRIOT Act.164 As described below,
the ATRC statutes provide LPRs with important procedural protections that are
superior to protections in conventional administrative removal proceedings.
Accounting for the possibility of a court identifying heightened due process rights
for an LPR in ATRC proceedings,165 a due process analysis that contemplates an
LPR defendant where an unclassified summary is not provided is not only the most
likely scenario for the court’s use, but also the scenario that triggers the most
procedural protections available to the defendant.
Congress carefully considered the constitutionality and the due process
implications of the ATRC statutes at the time of AEDPA’s enactment.166 Congress
intentionally engaged in due process balancing, designing what it believed would
be “an effective means of removing terrorist noncitizens from our shores, while
protecting due process concerns.”167 Moreover, the statutorily compliant utilization
of the ATRC by senior Justice Department leadership would squarely implicate
plenary powers doctrinal considerations that could weigh in the Executive Branch’s
favor on judicial review.168
constitutionally valid provision from each statute. The result is legislation that is within
the letter of the law but is arguably not within the spirit of our democracy[.]”).
163
We do not examine the constitutionality of the detention provisions in the ATRC
statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1534(i) & 1536(a)(2)(A), due to the high variability of their
potential use and the fact that there is ample detention authority contained elsewhere in
the INA under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231.
164
See supra § III.
165
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (contemplating possible variable
due process protection for “an alien subject to a final order of deportation” depending on
“status and circumstance”).
166
142 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also
141 CONG. REC. S6202, S6206 (daily ed. May 5, 1995) (section-by-section analysis)
(“[The ATRC provisions are] a carefully measured response to the menace posed by alien
terrorists and fully comports with and exceeds all constitutional requirements applicable
to aliens.”); 141 CONG. REC. S7484, S7487 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (remarks of Sen.
Biden) (criticizing the ATRC proposals as creating a “kind of Star Chamber proceeding”
predicated on the use of classified evidence); Yu, supra note 21, at 1 (“Congress
structured the ATRC to balance national security needs with fundamental notions of due
process.”).
167
142 CONG. REC. S3352, S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996).
168
See U.S. ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889) (deferring to
Congress or the agencies on the question of national security and immigration); but see
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that such deference is subject to the
Constitution in a case that involved a claim of unconstitutional prolonged immigration
detention—the judiciary “must defer to the Executive and Legislative Branch” on
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Due process protections are a central feature to the counter-majoritarian
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, and the adjudication of a due process
claim is an individualized determination.169 The Supreme Court has traditionally
relied on the three-part balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge to adjudicate Fifth
Amendment procedural due process claims.170 In a prospective as-applied
challenge to the revised ATRC—one that is based on legislative revision that aligns
with the recommendations of this article—a court would first need to consider the
varying private interest particulars of the case including any limitations on access
to classified evidentiary materials, the nature of the unclassified summary to the
extent one is provided, the fullness of notice related to the allegations of fact, the
judgment of the ATRC on questions of both fact and law, and potentially other
considerations.
The court then would likely weigh the foregoing against the government’s
national security and INA enforcement interests against alleged noncitizen
terrorists, along with the panoply of pro-defendant and pro-transparency
procedures, especially in comparison with administrative removal proceedings, to
determine “the risk of erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s protected
interest(s) and the “probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.”171 In some respects, the pro-defendant procedures of the ATRC
exceed those that were afforded by the Supreme Court in its maximalist opinion
regarding a welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly172 and in comparison to
procedures that exist in conventional administrative removal proceedings.
In particular and unlike administrative removal proceedings, there is direct
political accountability for the initiation of ATRC cases, vested in the Attorney
immigration questions, but the congressional “plenary power” on setting immigration
policy is “subject to constitutional limitations.”). See also Michael Kagan, Plenary
Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21,
23 (2015) (describing one scholar’s observation that the Supreme Court has deferred to
Congress on procedural due process questions less over time).
169
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 528-29 (2004) (observing that the Mathews test applies to property and liberty
interests):
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is
determined by weighing “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action” against the Government’s asserted interest, “including the
function involved” and the burdens the Government would face in
providing greater process [. . .]. The Mathews calculus then
contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an
analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if
the process were reduced and the “probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.”
171
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
172
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970). Notably, limitation of access to
classified information can implicate the particularized notice, cross-examination
capability, and breadth of the written decision following the adjudication procedures that
the welfare recipient in Goldberg was entitled.
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General or the Deputy Attorney General.173 There is also Article III accountability
for such case initiation with a weighty probable cause standard.174 Unlike
administrative removal proceedings that reserve Article III review until the
completion of a two-stage administrative adjudicatory process, there is Article III
administration of all stages of an ATRC case from initiation through final judgment
and appeal.175 Unlike administrative removal proceedings, there is a statutory
requirement for speedy proceedings in ATRC cases176 and the ATRC statutes
enumerate a right to government-financed counsel.177
Moreover, LPRs who were not provided a written summary of classified
information earlier in proceedings are entitled to government funded, cleared
“special” counsel to access and challenge the veracity of classified information,178
as well as appellate de novo review of ATRC factual findings.179 Such defendants
are also entitled to a “release hearing” before an ATRC judge upon the Justice
Department’s filing of a case-initiating application to the court.180 On appeal, there
are number of unique defendant-centric advantages in ATRC proceedings that
weigh favorably for the government in a Mathews inquiry.181 There is an automatic
stay of a removal order during the pendency of appeal.182 There is automatic appeal
of certain decisions,183 and there is a requirement for expedited appeal.184
Given the numerous procedures that Congress mandated to make the ATRC
less Star Chamber-like, a visual reference is helpful to convey the superior
procedural protections that LPR noncitizens are afforded in an ATRC proceeding.
Comparison of Relative Procedures for ATRC and EOIR Proceeding for LPRs
173

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (administrative removal proceedings are initiated by the
lodging of a “Notice to Appear,” which flows from delegable authority) with id.
§ 1533(a)(1) (requiring non-delegable authorization).
174
Id. § 1533(c)(2). The government may supplement its application with “information,
including classified information, presented under oath or affirmation” and testimony at a
hearing on the application. Id. § 1533(c)(1)
175
Compare id. § 1252(a)(5), (b) (describing a petition for review process for
administratively final orders of removal) with id. §§ 1531-1537 (contemplating the
Article III function at all stages of adjudication). The government may supplement its
application with “information, including classified information, presented under oath or
affirmation” and testimony at a hearing on the application. Id. § 1533(c)(1)
176
8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (“a removal hearing shall be conducted under this section as
expeditiously as practicable”). Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove
Bigger Barrier for Migrants Than Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us/migrants-border-immigrationcourt.html (examining the consequences of an immigration court backlog in excess of
800,000 cases).
177
8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1).
178
Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E), (F).
179
Id. § 1535(c)(4)(D).
180
Id. § 1536(a)(2)(A).
181
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
182
8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1).
183
Id. § 1535(c)(2)(A).
184
Id. § 1535(c)(4).
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Procedure
Article II political
accountability to
initiate and prosecute
removal?
Article III probable
cause threshold
determination required
to initiate proceeding?
Classified evidence
availability without
disclosure to LPR, incl.
FISA and foreign
intelligence evidence?
Right to (potentially
cleared) counsel at
government expense?
Article III removal
hearing and
adjudication?
Applicability of Fed.
Rules of Evidence?
Availability of
nationwide subpoena
power to summon
witnesses, incl. gov’t
funded attendance and
fees?
Expedited hearing?

ATRC proceedings
Yes; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(1)

EOIR proceedings
No

Process advantage
ATRC defendant

Yes; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1533(c)(2)

No

ATRC defendant

Yes; e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(c)(2),
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(3)

No, limited
classified info. in
limited situations;
8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B)
No

EOIR respondent

ATRC defendant

Yes; e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(i)

No

ATRC defendant

No; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(h)
Yes; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(d)(1)-(4)

No; see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3)
No

N/A

Yes; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(a)(1)

No

Immediate and
potentially automatic
expedited Art. III
appeal availability?

Yes; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1535(c)

No; administrative
exhaustion is
required, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)

Yes; 8 U.S.C.

§ 1534(c)(1),
(e)(3)(F)

ATRC defendant

ATRC defendant
(for detention
purposes)
ATRC defendant

Accordingly, there are ample procedures that could lead Article III jurists
to conclude that the ATRC passes due process muster under a Mathews analysis,
but the ultimate test will come in an as-applied challenge if and when the court is
used, and then predicated principally on how persuasively primary and cleared
counsel argue that the withholding of certain classified evidence creates an
unacceptably high probability of judicial error.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though the ATRC currently presents as a zombie court, it was created for
the discrete and important purpose of reconciling the congressional imperatives of
protecting national security information and removing noncitizen terrorists while
maintaining fidelity to the Constitution and providing due process. It took three
successive presidential administrations to enact its statutory framework and it has
existed for nearly a quarter century without hearing a single case. The IIRIRA and
PARTIOT Act have since provided alternative mechanisms to hold accountable and
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remove non-LPRs noncitizens. Even so, the importance of the ATRC remains
static for the few terrorist LPRs who cannot otherwise be removed from the United
States. To the extent Congress enacts the commonsense and narrow reforms to the
statutes that we propose in this article, it is likely the ATRC will finally be rendered
functional and therefore able to fulfill its important function to provide an avenue
for the removal of the most serious LPR threats to national security. Indeed,
because of the ATRC’s procedural impediments, such individuals may very well
currently be present in the United States for want of prosecutorial tools to remove
them without compromising critical national security sources and information.
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE

A BILL
To amend the provision in Title 8, United States Code, related to the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court (8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537) to clarify the standards for
utilization of the ATRC.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. UPDATING THE ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT
1) Title 8, United States Code, Subchapter V (8 U.S.C. 1531-1537), is
amended:
a) by striking the period after “hearing” in section 1534(c)(5) and
inserting the following language at the end: “and all classified
evidence submitted to the court for in camera and ex parte review.”;
b) by striking “proceedings” in section 1534(e)(1)(A) and replacing with
“proceeding”;
c) by striking “person, and” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and replacing
with “person, or”;
d) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) and replacing with “serious damage”;
e) by striking “serious and irreparable harm” in section
1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) and replacing with “serious damage”;
f) by striking “the summary” in section 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(II) and
replacing with “an adequate summary”; and
g) by striking the cross-reference to “1534(c)(3)” in section
1535(c)(4)(D) and replacing with “1534(e)(3)”.
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